D espite ongoing advances in the modeling of global and regional climates, uncertainty remains high regarding future climate change and related impacts. We know that the climate will continue to change in fundamental and ecologically important ways, but how this will play out at the spatial and temporal scales relevant to the management of national parks, forest reserves, and other large natural areas (LNAs) remains an open question. This uncertainty has left many managers and policymakers in a state of paralysis where little or no meaningful action can be taken. Likewise, a large portion of the LNA community is banking on the development of regional climate models, downscaling approaches (i.e., statistically or physically based methods for translating model output at coarse scales to a model with a finer spatial resolution), and other technologies to bring climate change uncertainties down to a palatable level.
In reality, we can do little to reduce the uncertainties associated with many aspects of climate change. Given the economic, political, and demographic complexities underlying greenhouse gas emissions, for example, the best that we can hope for is to place wide bounds on changes to the composition of Earth's atmosphere. From a practical standpoint, this also means that the range of potential climates that we face expands rapidly as we look 20, 50, or 100 years out. Moreover, although we will continue to make tremendous progress in simulating the behavior of the atmosphere and the oceans, within this decade we will not attain the levels of predictive capability that most people desire. Add to this the fact that interactions between natural climate variability and human-induced trends further broaden the range of potential climate futures (Gray et al. 2006) , and the gap between what we think we know about climate change and the demands of traditional LNA management and planning becomes immense.
Simply put, there will never be a crystal ball that gives us precise, deterministic answers for what climate change holds in store. But if the LNA management and planning approaches of the past are now largely defunct, what comes next? At the most basic level, climate change demands that we move toward a mode of operation characterized by thoughtful, realistic assessments of uncertainty; a willingness to identify and challenge assumptions; and the capacity to be flexible-both intellectually and institutionally-in our responses. When viewed in this context, global circulation models, regional climate models, and downscaling become vehicles for more fully exploring what climate change might bring us, rather than a means to fashion rigid expectations of the future.
One example of how this new planning and management mode might look comes from the US National Park Service's (NPS) Climate Change Response Program (CCRP) and its use of scenario planning. As it is applied by the CCRP and others (see Peterson et al. 2003) , scenario planning refers to a process in which stakeholders first define a specific question of interest (e.g., how might climate change affect runoff and aquatic ecosystems in high-elevation parks?) and then use that question to guide managers From Uncertainty to Action: Climate Change Projections and the Management of Large Natural Areas STEPHEN T. GRAY and scientists in identifying factors that could influence their LNA in significant ways. At the same time, these groups begin an assessment of associated knowledge gaps, the limitations of existing data, and inherent complexities (e.g., feedbacks and nonlinear interactions) so that a set of key drivers of change and critical uncertainties emerge. In turn, these drivers and uncertainties become the basis for scenarios-essentially qualitative descriptions of alternate futures-that can be used as a foundation for exploring potential climate change impacts, vulnerabilities, and adaptation and mitigation responses. The exact methods used to generate these scenarios may vary with the desired application and the players involved, but in all cases the resulting "storylines" must be scientifically plausible and logically consistent. Ideally, the scenarios are also divergent (i.e., each scenario represents a distinct end-member across a spectrum of possibilities), relevant to the needs of stakeholders, and challenging in ways that spur further debate and conversation. As Jonathan Star, an expert in scenario planning with the Global Business Network, explained during a recent NPS-sponsored workshop, the intention is not to capture the one true future. Instead, Star said that "scenario planning provides us [with] an opportunity to better understand the process of change."
In the case of CCRP efforts, models have become a primary source of information for highlighting potential climate-related drivers of change, for placing scientifically plausible bounds on those drivers, and for defining associated uncertainties. Multimodel averages from coarse-scale output are used Viewpoint to define a baseline case for parks and surrounding lands, whereas individual coarse-scale model results and intermodel comparisons provide a sense of the underlying uncertainties. Downscaling is used to provide additional information on the range of projected climatic changes and, in particular, the upper and lower extremes of those projections. In many situations, downscaling is also used to explore how climatic change at the regional to subcontinental scale might play out across complex terrain. Information derived from projections can be complemented with lessons drawn from actual observations (e.g., Have extreme heat events changed in areas that have seen an increase in mean summer temperatures?) and from paleoclimatic archives (Jackson et al. 2009 ). What climate models are not used for is to divine the most likely outcome for future climate change, or to put hard, static values on future climates.
Of course, all the climate modeling in the world is worthless unless this information can be put to practical use. After years of watching managers and scientists alike try to force climate change projections into the traditional planning mold, it is abundantly clear that the most common results are confusion and a sense of futility. In short, these efforts are almost invariably sidetracked by our inability to reconcile climate model uncertainties with a perceived need to "know" the future. However, through a string of recent scenario-planning workshops involving the NPS, conservation organizations, and various state resource management agencies, I have also seen firsthand how climate projections can be used to jump-start adaptation and mitigation efforts and to shape policy. Generally speaking, these exercises are based on between three and five climate change scenarios that were largely derived from model projections. The scenarios tend to represent a range of altered drought regimes (e.g., altered frequency or severity), combined with changes to the frequency, duration, or magnitude of extreme climatic events (e.g., fewer but more intense snowstorms), although I have also seen many other climate drivers considered. Once these scenarios are in place, potential management actions are "walked through" each of the alternate futures, with participants asking whether a response is technically feasible, financially viable, and likely to be effective. In the end, groups inevitably identify a set of actions that might be thought of as win-win situations or responses that will be beneficial no matter what climate future is realized. Also, the participants often find "no-gain" actions that are not likely to be viable under any future climate regime. In this way, scenario planning is used to help identify and prioritize climate change responses, and I am beginning to see the results incorporated into guidance documents, policy, and on-the-ground actions. Just as importantly, scenario planning provides a forum to consider actions and outcomes that would otherwise be economically or politically unacceptable. Perhaps this is a natural outcome of a process designed to challenge perceptions, but I have been amazed to see how entrenched interests and pet projects can be set aside in the midst of a scenario-planning exercise.
However it happens-through scenario planning or some other means-it is essential that we integrate climate projections into LNA management and planning, while also recognizing the limits of our knowledge. Climate models will serve us best when viewed as one tool among many to help us understand the range of potential impacts that we face and as a tool to show us where we are most vulnerable to change. Climate models are by no means perfect, and they never will be. Yet when used judiciously and in concert with the many other sources of information at our disposal, climate projections give us more than enough guidance to start acting today.
